

A Supplemental Materials

IMF: International Migration Fund

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International Interactions

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A.1 Sample Statistics

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
ln(Loan Size)	4.701	1.657	0.560	10.182	771
G5 Migrants	0.18	0.411	0	5.595	771
G2 Migrants	.09	.343	0	5.59	771
G3 Migrants	.055	.179	0	1.481	771
GDP Growth	2.556	6.198	-34.859	54.159	765
Polity	1.221	6.486	-10	10	734
ln(Population)	15.83	1.513	10.809	20.788	771
ln(GDP)	23.456	1.981	18.815	31.15	766
ln(Total Imports from G5)	25.255	0.679	23.798	26.362	766
ln(Total Exports to G5)	25.444	0.712	23.974	26.601	766
G5 Alliance	0.31	0.344	0	0.902	771
ln(US Bank Exposure)	4.664	2.552	0	11.145	529
ln(G5 Aid)	0.033	0.081	-0.02	1.332	584
ln(Remittances)	18.14	2.724	9.309	23.406	615
G5 Election	0.381	0.249	0	0.73	771
G5 RWP	0.494	0.289	0.016	0.885	771
G5 Right	21.064	9.82	6.51	34.175	771
G5 Left	5.816	4.501	0	16.31	771
Number of All Conditions	58.486	42.945	0	257	771
Hard Conditions	17.324	13.172	0	93	771
Soft Conditions	18.16	20.061	0	119	771
QPC	14.328	9.352	0	52	771
SPC	2.996	5.656	0	50	771
Labor	1.958	3.571	0	23	771
Fiscal	7.086	8.475	0	53	771
Debt	7.999	5.21	0	34	771
Poverty	0.477	1.273	0	15	771
Social	0.432	1.289	0	14	771
Waiver	3.501	6.307	0	67	771
Emigration Rate (Total)	0.048	0.08	0	0.482	152
Emigration Rate (Low-Skill)	0.042	0.08	0	0.512	152
Emigration Rate (Med-Skill)	0.049	0.075	0.001	0.366	152
Emigration Rate (High-Skill)	0.185	0.212	0.001	0.937	152

A.2 Migration Pressure and the IMF Loan Size Extensions

Table A2: G2 & G3 Migrations and IMF Loan Size

	(A1)	(A2)
G2 (US and Japan) Migrants	0.745 (0.451)	
G2 Migrants \times GDP Growth	-0.047 (0.043)	
G3 Migrants (UK, Germany, and France) Migrants		1.708 (2.293)
G3 Migrants \times GDP Growth		-0.034 (0.023)
GDP Growth	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)
Polity	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)
Population (log)	-1.765*** (0.467)	-1.818*** (0.429)
GDP (log)	-0.057+ (0.032)	-0.056+ (0.032)
Total Imports from G5 (log)	14.814*** (2.290)	11.133 (7.618)
Total Exports to G5 (log)	-13.594*** (2.274)	-9.945 (7.500)
G5 Alliance	-0.117 (0.515)	-0.152 (0.518)
Observations	716	716
Countries	116	116
R ²	0.852	0.854


Note: These estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable is the natural log of loan size committed to country j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$. Year and country fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country j and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance levels of 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A3: G5 Migration, Electoral Variables, and IMF Loan Size


	(A3)	(A4)
G5 Migrants	0.787 (0.583)	0.034 (0.961)
GDP Growth	0.012 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.012)
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth	-0.060 (0.038)	-0.056 (0.039)
G5 Migrants × G5 Election	0.044 (0.063)	
GDP Growth × G5 Election	-0.031 ⁺ (0.018)	
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth × G5 Election	0.044 (0.063)	
G5 Migrants × G5 RWP		0.509 (0.750)
GDP Growth × G5 RWP		0.012 (0.020)
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth × G5 RWP		0.019 (0.068)
Polity	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)
Population (log)	-1.758 ^{***} (0.447)	-1.734 ^{***} (0.442)
GDP (log)	-0.060 ⁺ (0.032)	-0.059 ⁺ (0.033)
Total Imports from G5 (log)	13.816 ^{***} (2.797)	13.961 ^{***} (2.990)
Total Exports to G5 (log)	-12.635 ^{***} (2.755)	-12.761 ^{***} (3.079)
G5 Alliance	-0.144 (0.509)	-0.142 (0.525)
Observations	716	716
Countries	116	116
R ²	0.855	0.855

Note: These estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable is the natural log of loan size committed to country j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$. Year and country fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country j and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Figure A1: Marginal Effects of G5 Migrants with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model A6)



(a) Low Value of G5 Left



(b) High Value of G5 Left

Table A4: G5 Migration, Partisanship, and IMF Loan Size


	(A5)	(A6)
G5 Migrants	1.069 ⁺ (0.555)	0.721* (0.341)
GDP Growth	0.022 ⁺ (0.013)	0.001 (0.010)
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth	-0.106 (0.066)	0.009 (0.030)
G5 Migrants × G5 Right	-0.013 (0.009)	
GDP Growth × G5 Right	-0.001 ⁺ (0.001)	
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth × G5 Right	0.002 (0.002)	
G5 Migrants × G5 Left		0.026 (0.017)
GDP Growth × G5 Left		-0.000 (0.002)
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth × G5 Left		-0.008* (0.004)
Polity	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)
Population (log)	-1.769*** (0.457)	-1.718*** (0.430)
GDP (log)	-0.054 ⁺ (0.031)	-0.060 ⁺ (0.032)
Total Imports from G5 (log)	14.149*** (2.744)	15.369*** (3.334)
Total Exports to G5 (log)	-12.997*** (2.701)	-14.228*** (3.809)
G5 Alliance	-0.117 (0.514)	-0.141 (0.515)
Observations	716	716
Countries	116	116
R ²	0.855	0.856

Note: These estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable is the natural log of loan size committed to country j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$. Year and country fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country j and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

A.3 Migration Concerns in the G5 Countries

G5 policymakers' migration concerns stem from their electorates' apprehension about unwanted immigration.³¹ Citizens across the Global North are generally opposed to higher immigration inflows (Figure A2). For instance, European public attitudes in 2015 show that the majority of Europeans (52 percent) preferred that migration levels decrease or stay the same (International Organization for Migration 2015). These numbers reached 69 percent in the UK, 44 percent in France (compared to 6 percent preferring an increase in migration), and 84 percent in the Mediterranean countries—Spain, Italy, and Greece—that serve as migrants' entry points in Western Europe.

Figure A2: Global Attitudes toward Immigration (%), 2015




Survey Question: In your view, should immigration in this country be kept at its present level, increased or decreased? Data Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Similar trends are observed in the US from 2001 to 2020 (Figure A3), where most citizens are dissatisfied with the country's immigration levels (Figure A3a) and would prefer to see it decrease (Figure A3b). Public opposition to immigration is linked to labor market

³¹Numerous studies examine the roots of anti-immigration attitudes in wealthy, advanced democracies, and the implications for immigration policymaking. For instance, see Freeman (1995); Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007; 2010); Scheve and Slaughter (2001a); Zolberg (1989). For the influence of anti-immigrant right-wing populists, see Messina (2002); Swank and Betz (2003). For labor unions, see Haus (2002); Briggs

Figure A3: US Public Opinion on Immigration (%), 2001-2020




Data Source: Gallup

competition and skill levels of both natives and immigrants. An influx of low-skilled immigrants—measured by education levels and wages—triggers anxiety about potential losses in jobs and income among low-skilled native citizens (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b). While high-skilled natives are less opposed to immigration (Mayda 2006), their sociotropic attitudes and altruism for compatriots can produce opposition toward immigration (Citrin, Green, Muste et al. 1997; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kustov 2021). Other works find that the country of immigrant origin is the primary reason that immigrants provoke host countries’ opposition toward immigration, including restricting access to naturalization (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Shehaj, Shin, and Inglehart 2021).

Even German society, which had historically accommodated immigrants, has shown strong perceptions of alienation toward guest workers and immigrants, particularly those belonging to cultures perceived to be distant from the German culture. A 1982 Allensbach survey shows that German citizens harboured negative attitudes toward Turkish and Italian guest workers for “behaving differently” and “taking away jobs” (Figure A4). These (1984; 2001).

attitudes, however, were stronger for Turkish immigrants whose Islamic heritage made them seem more culturally distant than Italian guest workers. Negative opinions about immigrant outgroups of different religions have persisted over time. A 2006 Allensbach survey shows that a majority of German respondents based their distrust of Muslim immigrants on their disdain for Islam which they perceived to be predominantly backward (62 percent), undemocratic (60 percent), and intolerant of others (71 percent).³²

Figure A4: Citizen Attitudes toward Italian and Turkish Immigrants in West Germany (1982)



Source: Allensbach Archives, IfD Survey 4005.

³²Allensbach Archives, IfD Survey 7089, May 2006.

A.4 Colonial Migration

The colonial history between the G5 countries and the borrowing country shapes both IMF lending decisions and migrant networks in the G5 countries. Within migrant-sending countries, individuals are likely to have greater knowledge of the laws, economy, and culture of their former colonial powers (Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets 2014, p. 418). This type of information is often critical for potential migrants when seeking employment opportunities and new places of residence.

Table A5 presents correlations between each major shareholder's migrant stock and whether the migrant-sending country is a former colony of the specific IMF shareholder (indicated in the left column).³³ As shown, major IMF shareholders host a substantial number of migrants from their former colonies. Yet with the exception of Japan, these coefficients are smaller than be expected. In addition, the G5 colony dummy is negatively related to the size of G5 migrant stocks as a whole. This is more consistent with conditional relationships between colonial history and international migration patterns (e.g., Neumayer 2005; Riley and Emigh 2002).

Table A5: Relationship between Former Colonial Relationships and Migration

	Correlation with Migrant Stock
FRA Colony	0.2087
GER Colony	0.2073
JPN Colony	0.9347
UK Colony	0.4186
US Colony	0.1371
G5 Colony	-0.1450

Nevertheless, we include borrowing-country fixed effects in all of our models take into account that major IMF shareholders treat their former colonies more favorably than other loan recipients (e.g., Stone 2004).

³³Note that these correlations are calculated for the sample within our dataset.

A.5 Selection into IMF Programs

In this section, we consider whether countries with larger migrant stocks in the G5 countries are more likely to enter into IMF programs.³⁴ While this is a good way to uncover the characteristics of countries that sign agreements with the Fund, findings from this exercise do not complicate the implications of our previous analysis. For instance, even if countries with large G5 migrant stocks are more likely borrow from the IMF, there would still be variation in *G5 Migrants* across borrowing countries, which we exploit to predict loan size. Nevertheless, we use logistic regression analysis to see whether *G5 Migrants* is an important determinant of IMF program participation. We report the results in Table A6 in the appendix.

First, we pool all countries between 1978 and 2014, including the G5 countries, and account for the grouped nature of observations by specifying a random-effects model. In this model (A7), we also include year fixed effects to control for common temporal shocks. In the second model (A8), we specify a country-fixed-effects model where we include five-year period fixed effects and a common time trend in lieu of year fixed effects to facilitate model convergence. Including country fixed effects forces the model to drop all countries that have never entered into IMF programs in the sample as well as those that have always been under IMF programs. Since only the former group exists in our sample, using this model excludes both wealthy countries, including the G5 countries, and reclusive regimes, such as North Korea.

There is a trade-off between fixed-effects and random-effects models in terms of high variance and bias. Fixed effects are favored because *G5 Migrants* may be correlated with time-invariant unit effects, such as colonial legacy with one or more of the G5 countries. However, there are technical issues to take into account regarding fixed effects. Since *G5 Migrants* changes gradually over time within each country, using a fixed-effects model

³⁴There is a large literature on IMF program participation. See Bird (1996) for an excellent review of the economics literature. See Trudel (2005) for the effects of the exchange rate regime and Nooruddin and Woo (2015) for the role of domestic politics.

Table A6: G5 Migration and IMF Program Participation

	(A7)	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)	(A11)
G5 Migrants	-0.230 (0.199)	-0.411 (0.253)	-0.089 (0.146)	-0.377 ⁺ (0.220)	-0.214 (0.168)
GDP Growth	-0.030 ^{***} (0.007)	-0.028 ^{**} (0.009)	-0.019 ⁺ (0.011)	-0.026 [*] (0.012)	-0.038 [*] (0.016)
Polity	0.025 [*] (0.010)	0.045 ^{**} (0.015)	0.029 ⁺ (0.015)	0.020 (0.016)	0.009 (0.025)
ln(Population)	0.327 ^{***} (0.078)	0.807 (0.586)	1.496 [*] (0.760)	0.929 (0.692)	0.486 (1.238)
ln(GDP)	-0.267 ^{***} (0.051)	-0.048 (0.044)	0.016 (0.060)	-0.066 (0.228)	-0.053 (0.272)
ln(Total Imports from G5)	-52.285 (72.675)	1.694 (1.103)	0.907 (1.286)	1.574 (1.218)	2.997 [*] (1.377)
ln(Total Exports from G5)	88.776 (125.726)	-0.603 (0.805)	0.252 (0.957)	-0.649 (0.931)	-2.544 [*] (1.097)
G5 Alliance	0.115 (0.265)	-0.044 (0.720)	-0.973 (0.779)	-1.861 ⁺ (1.055)	-9.566 (6.680)
ln(G5 Aid)			0.001 (0.002)		
ln(Remittances)				-0.121 [*] (0.052)	
Banking Crisis					0.359 (0.347)
Currency Crisis					0.627 ^{**} (0.198)
Systemic Crisis					-0.219 (0.387)
Inflation Crisis					-0.126 (0.264)
Time Trend		-0.124 ⁺ (0.067)	-0.181 [*] (0.081)	-0.093 (0.072)	-0.084 (0.095)
Random Effects	✓	-	-	-	-
Fixed Effects	Year	Country & 5-Year	Country & 5-Year	Country & 5-Year	Country & 5-Year
Observations	5241	3989	2819	3110	1716
Countries	159	116	96	112	47

Note: These estimates are from logistic regression. The dependent variable is the binary indicator of IMF program participation for country j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to country j in Year $t - 1$. For Models A8 through A11, standard errors are clustered on country j and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

can destabilize the estimates of the effect of the variable (Clark and Linzer 2015, 403). In addition, these modeling choices lead to inevitable differences in the sample as a fixed-effects model drops units with no variation in the dependent variable. Yet, pooling all countries across the globe or using arbitrary criteria to exclude some countries can also lead to biased inferences. The results of Models A7 and A8 show the null effects of G5

Migrants. Regardless of the modeling strategy, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that countries with larger migrant stocks in the G5 countries are not more or less likely to enter into IMF programs. In Model A9, we include $\ln(G5\ Aid)$ as a control to the fixed-effects specification. There is no evidence that countries receiving ODA from the G5 countries are more likely to sign agreements with the Fund. In Model A10, we include $\ln(Remittances)$ as a control and find some evidence that countries drawing on remittances as a source of external finance are less likely to borrow from the Fund. This is consistent with our previous results from Model 5 of Table 1. In this model, we find a slight *negative* correlation between *G5 Migrants* and IMF program participation. Finally, Model A11 includes dummy variables for different types of financial crisis, and we find that countries experiencing a currency crisis are more likely to enter into IMF programs.³⁵ Across the five models in Table A6, we find no evidence that countries with larger values of *G5 Migrants* are more likely to sign into IMF programs.

There is little doubt that countries with underlying economic problems are more likely to borrow from the Fund and have a higher number of emigrants. However, not all emigrant-sending countries have sizable diasporas in the G5 countries. Historical relationships between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, such as common colonial legacy (Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets 2014) and past bilateral labor agreements (Peters 2019), give birth to sizable migrant communities. This unique nature of migration can explain why our selection models do not corroborate the effect of *G5 Migrants* on the likelihood of IMF program participation in the suggested direction.

Nevertheless, sample selection bias could still represent a concern in the main results. Given that our statistical sample in the main analysis is non-random—that is, we only observe countries that are offered and agree to IMF programs—it remains possible that there are unobservable features associated with both loan size and entry into the sample. To

³⁵The crisis dataset was retrieved from the Global Crises Data by Country from the Behavioral Finance and Financial Stability Project at Harvard Business School: <https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-finance-and-financial-stability/data/Pages/global.aspx>.

the extent that this is true, these unobservables threaten to produce biased and inconsistent estimates.

We address this endogeneity concern by estimating a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979). First, we use a global sample of countries from 1980 to 2013 in order to estimate a probit model predicting the likelihood of entering into an IMF program in year t . This model also calculates an inverse Mills ratio for each country-year in which a new IMF program is observed. The inverse Mills ratio—commonly referred to as the “non-selection hazard”—can be thought of as a measure indicating how probable an IMF program is for IMF participant country i in year t . Second, we regress $\ln(\text{Loan Size})$ on $G5 \text{ Migrants}$ using an OLS model but including the inverse Mills ratio as an additional covariate.

The precision of Heckman models relies on the predictive power of the first-stage equation as well as the availability of a valid instrument (Winship and Mare 1992; Stubbs, Reinsberg, Kentikelenis et al. 2020). We therefore specify our first-stage model as follows. We predict IMF program entry using a series of macroeconomic and political indicators offered by the existing literature.³⁶ Our macroeconomic measures include GDP per Capita (log), foreign currency reserves (log), GDP growth, current account balance (% GDP), government consumption (% GDP), and the exchange rate level. Our political variables include whether the country is a UNSC member, whether the country holds a formal military alliance with a G5 country, % of time siding with the US in the UN General Assembly, and total exports to G5 countries (log).³⁷ Year and region fixed effects are also included to measure time trends as well as year-specific and region-specific shocks.³⁸

For an instrument in the first-stage equation, we use the IMF’s liquidity ratio interacted with *IMF Average*, which is the total number of times a country entered into an IMF program throughout the time series divided by the number of years.³⁹ This instrument is

³⁶See Steinwand and Stone (2008) for an excellent review.

³⁷Since data availability is a major concern for other potential predictors, such as unemployment rates or bank exposure, we elect to omit such variables in order to preserve the representative sample of our first-stage model.

³⁸Country fixed effects are omitted from the selection equation due to the incidental parameter problem.

³⁹According to the Fund, the liquidity ratio is “a measure of the IMF’s liquidity position, represented

introduced and defended by Lang (2020), but can be briefly explained as follows. Generally, *IMF Average* is robustly associated with future participation in IMF programs given the high rate of recidivism and the Fund possessing a regular clientele. However, as the IMF's resources expand, the Fund will increasingly have the capacity and willingness to expand lending to new participants. Thus, *IMF Average* should be positively associated with IMF program entry while the *IMF Average* \times *IMF Liquidity Ratio* interaction term should be negatively signed. Importantly, changes in IMF Liquidity Ratio are exogenously determined by IMF Quota Reviews which occur periodically according to institutional rules. Moreover, by controlling for the constituent terms, the exclusion restriction of *IMF Average* \times *IMF Liquidity Ratio* is only violated if endogeneity between $\ln(\text{Loan Size})$ and IMF liquidity operates differently across countries depending on their past levels of IMF participation (Lang 2020).

by the ratio of its net uncommitted usable resources to its liquid liabilities." See <https://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/liquid/>.


Table A7: Predictors of IMF Program Entry (1980-2013)

	(A12)
Instrument	
IMF Average \times IMF Liquidity Ratio	-0.002** (0.001)
IMF Average	6.336*** (0.401)
Macroeconomic Covariates	
ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.015 (0.011)
ln(Reserves)	-0.074*** (0.016)
GDP Growth	-0.019*** (0.006)
Current Account Balance (% GDP)	-0.007** (0.002)
Government Consumption (% GDP)	-0.001 (0.004)
Exchange Rate	0.000 ⁺ (0.000)
Political Covariates	
UNSC Member	0.028 (0.100)
% Agree with US	0.023 (0.369)
G5 Alliance	0.047 (0.118)
ln(G5 Exports)	1.737 (1.540)
Region Dummies	
Asia	0.229** (0.075)
Europe	0.321* (0.127)
Middle East	0.234* (0.101)
North and South America	0.096 (0.075)
Year Fixed Effects	✓
Countries	159
Observations	4110

Note: Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

To evaluate the predictive power of our first-stage equation, Table A7 regresses *IMF Program Entry* on our battery of predictors and reports coefficients when estimating a probit model. The instrument, *IMF Average* \times *IMF Liquidity Ratio*, is in the predicted negative direction. The overall fit of the model is also quite good, correctly predicting 87.06% of observations. Figure A5 plots the receiving operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The area-under-the-curve (AUC) is 0.8151, suggesting the model is relatively accurate.

Figure A5: Receiving Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve



Given a satisfactory first-stage model, we next estimate the relationship between *G5 Migrants* and $\ln(\text{Loan Size})$ using a Heckman selection model. Table A8 reports the non-selection hazard (λ) and coefficients from the second-stage equation. Model (A13) includes only the macroeconomic variables in the first-stage equation while Model (A14) adds in the political variables into the first-stage equation. Both country and year fixed effects are included in the first-stage equation to control for time-invariant country characteristics and time trends, respectively. The statistically insignificant non-selection hazard suggests sample selection bias may not be present. Nevertheless, we still find evidence that is consistent with Hypothesis 1. In both models, the interaction term is negative ($p < 0.01$)

Table A8: Heckman Model of IMF Loan Size (1980-2013)

	(A13)	(A14)
G5 Migrants	0.886*** (0.253)	0.883*** (0.253)
GDP Growth	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth	-0.050*** (0.015)	-0.050*** (0.015)
Polity	-0.018 ⁺ (0.009)	-0.018 ⁺ (0.009)
ln(Population)	-1.953*** (0.526)	-1.954*** (0.531)
ln(GDP)	0.022 (0.042)	0.021 (0.042)
λ	0.046 (0.391)	0.014 (0.519)
First-stage Covariates		
Macroeconomic Variables	✓	✓
Political Variables		✓
Observations (Selected)	504	503

Note: Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

while the *G5 Migrants* constituent term is positive ($p < 0.01$). Thus, countries with large pre-existing stocks of migrants living in G5 countries are associated with larger loans from the Fund—though this effect is restricted to IMF borrowing countries with either low or negative growth rates.

A.6 Migration Pressure and IMF Conditionality Extensions

Table A9: G5 Migration, Growth, and IMF Conditionality

	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)	(A18)	(A19)
	All	Hard	Soft	QPC	SPC
	Conditions	Conditions	Conditions		
G5 Migrants	-0.296 (0.248)	-0.458 ⁺ (0.248)	2.730 (1.891)	-0.345 (0.223)	-3.240** (1.230)
GDP Growth	0.012* (0.005)	0.013* (0.005)	-0.000 (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	0.037** (0.014)
G5 Migrants × GDP Growth	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.042)	-0.008 (0.017)	0.008 (0.084)
Polity	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.017 (0.024)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.026 (0.019)
ln(Population)	0.522* (0.240)	0.627** (0.241)	-1.217 (0.862)	0.668** (0.233)	0.775 (0.874)
ln(GDP)	-0.053 (0.043)	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.084 (0.097)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.183** (0.063)
ln(Total Imports from G5)	-0.863 (0.642)	0.162 (0.745)	-3.863** (1.433)	0.294 (0.717)	-1.858 (1.963)
ln(Total Exports to G5)	1.309** (0.492)	0.344 (0.538)	6.446*** (1.346)	0.283 (0.519)	0.805 (1.559)
G5 Alliance	0.596* (0.292)	0.513 (0.327)	-0.825** (0.312)	0.584* (0.294)	-0.191 (0.951)
Time Trend	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)	-0.022* (0.009)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.008 (0.009)
Observations	705	705	705	705	705
Countries	114	114	114	114	114

Note: These estimates are from negative binomial regression models. The dependent variable is the number of conditions given to borrowing country j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$. Country fixed effects and five-year period fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A10: G5 Migration and Other Types of IMF Conditionality

	(A20)	(A21)	(A22)	(A23)	(A24)
	Fiscal	Debt	Poverty	Social	Waiver
G5 Migrants	-0.161 (0.193)	-0.093 (0.192)	0.202 (3.838)	-0.860 (1.953)	-0.020 (0.784)
GDP Growth	0.007 (0.006)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.013)
Polity	-0.012 (0.013)	0.004 (0.006)	0.000 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.030)	-0.015 (0.013)
ln(Population)	-0.025 (0.590)	0.442 ⁺ (0.260)	1.838 (1.427)	-0.499 (1.205)	1.730 ⁺ (0.888)
ln(GDP)	-0.105 (0.113)	-0.032 (0.038)	0.050 (0.274)	-0.516* (0.213)	0.109 (0.083)
ln(Total Imports from G5)	-1.683 ⁺ (0.935)	-1.056 ⁺ (0.567)	5.260 ⁺ (2.853)	3.238 (3.151)	1.426 (1.698)
ln(Total Exports to G5)	2.960*** (0.765)	1.271** (0.437)	-0.367 (2.729)	0.230 (2.915)	0.601 (1.268)
G5 Alliance	0.108 (0.243)	0.265 (0.183)	-0.383 (1.076)	-0.720 (0.802)	-0.588 (0.466)
Time Trend	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.099 (0.116)	-0.049 (0.146)	-0.041*** (0.010)
Number of All Conditions					0.022*** (0.002)
Observations	705	705	705	705	705
Countries	114	114	114	114	114

Note: These estimates are from negative binomial regression models. The dependent variable is the number of conditions or waivers given to borrowing country j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$. Country fixed effects and five-year period fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

A.7 IMF Programs and Emigration

An assumption of our main argument is that stricter IMF lending—whether in the form of smaller loans, more stringent conditions, or less policy flexibility—is likely to increase the flow of emigration out of the borrowing country. More accurately, it is only important that G5 policymakers *believe* this dynamic is at play. For instance, although there is limited evidence that development assistance is ineffective in deterring migration (e.g., Clemens and Postel 2018), governments of wealthy countries have used foreign aid to address the “root causes” of migration or to “buy” emigration-restricting policies of developing countries (e.g., Bermeo and Leblang 2015). In addition, the Trump administration announced resumption of foreign aid for Central American countries for the explicit purpose of reducing migration into the US. Furthermore, their agents at the Fund are not necessarily fully aware of the effects of loan size and conditionality on migration flows, but they might use the Fund’s policy instruments at their disposal in hopes of reducing future migration inflows into their countries. Nevertheless, we explore whether IMF lending exhibits an observable effect on emigration rates in borrowing countries.

IMF lending and emigration rates may associate with each other for two different reasons. First, IMF programs can induce negative short-term economic effects, such as a rise in unemployment and reduced public spending, which encourage workers to seek better economic opportunities abroad. The opposite may be true of generous IMF programs with more flexible approaches to policy conditionality. Second, IMF programs can also signal to workers their job opportunities and socioeconomic welfare will diminish (or increase) in the future. In this regard, IMF programs can shape the *beliefs* of individuals, which alter how they perceive the opportunity costs (and potential benefits) of migration. If this is true, the effects of IMF lending on emigration will manifest independently of the macroeconomic conditions within the borrowing country.

As a first-cut empirical test of this relationship, we use country-year emigration data from Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk (2013), which contains emigration rates by skill

level to OECD countries at five-year intervals between 1985 and 2010. Using this data allows us to detect flows specifically to advanced industrial democracies, while also measuring the movements of low-, medium-, and high-skill migrants. However, we only observe emigration rates every five years (e.g., 1980, 1985, etc.), reducing the sample size substantially. We take all independent variables either from the preceding year ($t - 1$) or from $t - 2$. For example, for an observation in 1985, we take independent variables from 1984 or 1983. Since our dependent variable is a fraction ranging from zero to one, we use fractional outcome probit regression models with country and year fixed effects. We also cluster standard errors on borrowing countries.

We report a total of six tables: (1) Table A11 for the total emigration rate; (2) Table A12 for the low-skilled emigration rate; (3) Table A13 for the medium-skilled emigration; (4) Table A14 for the high-skilled emigration rate; (5) Table A15 for the effects of private- and public-specific labor conditions on the total and low-skilled emigration rates; and (6) Table A16 for the effects of private- and public-specific labor conditions on the medium- and high-skilled emigration rates. These rates are the migrant shares of the pre-migration populations defined as the sum of residents and migrants in each origin country. In each table, we present three different covariate specifications with two lag structures for the covariates such as $t - 1$ and $t - 2$, for a total of six models. In the first specification, we include $\ln(\text{Loan Size})$, the numbers of conditions classified under labor, fiscal, debt, poverty, and social, and the number of waivers. In the second specification, we include the numbers of soft and hard conditions along with $\ln(\text{loan Size})$. Finally, the third specification includes the numbers of conditions categorized as QPCs and SPCs. In all models, we include *Growth*, $\ln(\text{Population})$, $\ln(\text{GDP})$, and *Polity* as additional covariates.

The limited availability of the emigration data prohibits us from making any strong claim on the relationship between IMF lending and emigration. Accordingly, the results should be interpreted with caution. In general, the coefficient of $\ln(\text{Loan Size})$ is generally negative while the coefficients of conditions are positive across the four tables. Low- and

medium-skilled emigration rates are more sensitive to labor conditions, and high-skilled emigration responds strongly to loan size. In addition, loan size has a stronger effect in the models where all covariates are lagged by two years ($t - 2$) while conditions in $t - 1$ have stronger effect than those in $t - 2$. We believe this difference arises from that the loan size variable is a commitment of disbursements; it takes time for the loan variable to shape the economic expectations of potential emigrants. Given that all of the models include economic indicators, the coefficients of the loan and conditions variables capture two mechanisms. First, they influence migration dynamics through mechanisms not captured by the macroeconomic covariates. Second, they affect emigration patterns by shaping individual expectations about their future economic positions given the announced conditions and loan size. Given the wide coverage of IMF programs by the media in developing countries, we believe the second mechanism is an important force driving the relationship between emigration and IMF programs. In all tables, the coefficient of SPC ($t-1$) is consistently positive and statistically significant; a higher number of SPC is associated with a higher emigration rate. This finding is in accordance with our previous finding that *G5 Migrants* shows an exceptionally strong negative association with the number of SPC in Model 10 of Table 3.

Table A11: Loan Size, Conditionality, and Emigration Rate (Total)

	(A25)	(A26)	(A27)	(A28)	(A29)	(A30)
	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$
ln(Loan Size)	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.058* (0.025)	-0.033 (0.042)	-0.061 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.062 (0.039)
Labor	0.020** (0.006)	0.004 (0.008)				
Fiscal	0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)				
Debt	-0.004 (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)				
Poverty	0.024 (0.022)	0.050 (0.031)				
Social	-0.026 ⁺ (0.013)	-0.026 (0.018)				
Waiver	-0.002 (0.002)	0.006 (0.004)				
Soft			0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)		
Hard			0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)		
QPC					-0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)
SPC					0.011* (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)
Growth	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)
ln(Population)	-0.567*** (0.118)	-0.161 (0.241)	-0.528*** (0.147)	-0.188 (0.275)	-0.538*** (0.131)	-0.194 (0.269)
ln(GDP)	0.055 (0.058)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.132 ⁺ (0.076)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.070 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.013)
Polity	0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.009* (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)
Observations	144	145	144	145	144	145
Pseudo R ²	0.198	0.185	0.197	0.185	0.198	0.185

Note: These estimates are from fractional outcome probit regression models. The dependent variable is the rate of emigration (total) from j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$ or $t - 2$ as indicated in the second row of the table. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A12: Loan Size, Conditionality, and Emigration Rate (Low-Skilled)

	(A31)	(A32)	(A33)	(A34)	(A35)	(A36)
	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$
ln(Loan Size)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.046 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.045)	-0.060 (0.044)	-0.027 (0.042)	-0.059 (0.043)
Labor	0.019** (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)				
Fiscal	0.005* (0.002)	-0.009* (0.004)				
Debt	-0.003 (0.008)	0.006 (0.004)				
Poverty	0.010 (0.030)	0.025 (0.020)				
Social	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.016)				
Waiver	-0.005* (0.002)	0.002 (0.007)				
Soft			0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)		
Hard			0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)		
QPC					-0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
SPC					0.010* (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)
Growth	0.003* (0.001)	0.011 (0.007)	0.002 (0.002)	0.007 (0.007)	0.003 (0.002)	0.007 (0.007)
ln(Population)	-0.737*** (0.150)	-1.019*** (0.300)	-0.682*** (0.181)	-1.342*** (0.318)	-0.678*** (0.165)	-1.328*** (0.315)
ln(GDP)	0.174*** (0.050)	-0.051* (0.020)	0.208** (0.065)	-0.035* (0.018)	0.157** (0.057)	-0.034+ (0.018)
Polity	0.002 (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.010* (0.004)
Observations	144	145	144	145	144	145
Pseudo R ²	0.202	0.219	0.202	0.219	0.202	0.219

Note: These estimates are from fractional outcome probit regression models. The dependent variable is the rate of emigration (low-skilled) from j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$ or $t - 2$ as indicated in the second row of the table. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A13: Loan Size, Conditionality, and Emigration Rate (Medium-Skilled)

	(A37)	(A38)	(A39)	(A40)	(A41)	(A42)
	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$
ln(Loan Size)	-0.042 (0.051)	-0.088* (0.043)	-0.082 (0.081)	-0.065 (0.055)	-0.067 (0.065)	-0.074 (0.058)
Labor	0.034** (0.011)	-0.022 (0.020)				
Fiscal	-0.005 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)				
Debt	-0.010 (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)				
Poverty	0.059* (0.027)	0.063 (0.051)				
Social	-0.063+ (0.035)	-0.031 (0.031)				
Waiver	-0.005 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)				
Soft			0.000 (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)		
Hard			0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)		
QPC					-0.008+ (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)
SPC					0.017* (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)
Growth	0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.005 (0.007)	0.001 (0.010)	0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.010)
ln(Population)	-0.330+ (0.194)	-0.827 (0.532)	-0.342 (0.224)	-0.221 (0.481)	-0.396* (0.191)	-0.281 (0.465)
ln(GDP)	-0.209+ (0.120)	0.102* (0.046)	-0.040 (0.135)	0.074* (0.034)	-0.113 (0.116)	0.066* (0.031)
Polity	0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.005 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.008)
Observations	144	145	144	145	144	145
Pseudo R ²	0.221	0.203	0.219	0.202	0.220	0.202

Note: These estimates are from fractional outcome probit regression models. The dependent variable is the rate of emigration (medium-skilled) from j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$ or $t - 2$ as indicated in the second row of the table. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A14: Loan Size, Conditionality, and Emigration Rate (High-Skilled)

	(A43)	(A44)	(A45)	(A46)	(A47)	(A48)
	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$
ln(Loan Size)	0.037 (0.049)	-0.077* (0.035)	0.066 (0.042)	-0.095* (0.047)	0.040 (0.048)	-0.091* (0.044)
Labor	0.008 (0.009)	0.005 (0.008)				
Fiscal	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)				
Debt	0.013* (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)				
Poverty	0.065* (0.029)	-0.028 (0.027)				
Social	-0.066* (0.033)	0.014 (0.014)				
Waiver	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)				
Soft			0.007** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.001)		
Hard			0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)		
QPC					0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
SPC					0.010 ⁺ (0.006)	0.012 ⁺ (0.006)
Growth	-0.006 ⁺ (0.003)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.007 ⁺ (0.004)	-0.002 (0.006)
ln(Population)	-0.503 (0.328)	0.163 (0.425)	-0.501 (0.357)	-0.139 (0.430)	-0.418 (0.372)	-0.125 (0.395)
ln(GDP)	-0.260* (0.129)	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.075 (0.136)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.180 (0.144)	-0.017 (0.030)
Polity	0.005 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)
Observations	144	145	144	145	144	145
Pseudo R ²	0.226	0.191	0.226	0.190	0.225	0.191

Note: These estimates are from fractional outcome probit regression models. The dependent variable is the rate of emigration (high-skilled) from j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$ or $t - 2$ as indicated in the second row of the table. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A15: Loan Size, Labor Conditionality, and Emigration Rate

	(A49)	(A50)	(A51)	(A52)
	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$
Emigrant Skill Type	All	All	Low	Low
ln(Loan Size)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.047 ⁺ (0.024)	-0.034 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.031)
Labor (Private)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.067 (0.057)
Labor (Public)	0.021* (0.009)	0.008 (0.007)	0.022* (0.009)	0.020** (0.006)
Fiscal	0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.005 ⁺ (0.003)	-0.009** (0.004)
Debt	-0.004 (0.007)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.008* (0.004)
Poverty	0.023 (0.019)	0.050 (0.031)	0.005 (0.027)	0.025 (0.020)
Social	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.014)
Waiver	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 ⁺ (0.002)	-0.002 (0.006)
Growth	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003* (0.001)	0.010 (0.006)
ln(Population)	-0.584*** (0.116)	-0.105 (0.218)	-0.786*** (0.154)	-0.936*** (0.275)
ln(GDP)	0.067 (0.060)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.210** (0.073)	-0.049** (0.019)
Polity	0.005 (0.005)	-0.008 ⁺ (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Observations	144	145	144	145
Pseudo R ²	0.198	0.185	0.202	0.219

Note: These estimates are from fractional outcome probit regression models. The dependent variable is the rate of emigration from j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$ or $t - 2$ as indicated in the second row of the table. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

Table A16: Loan Size, Labor Conditionality, and Emigration Rate

	(A53)	(A54)	(A55)	(A56)
	$t - 1$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t - 2$
Emigrant Skill Type	Medium	Medium	High	High
ln(Loan Size)	-0.043 (0.053)	-0.079 ⁺ (0.045)	0.055 (0.049)	-0.071* (0.036)
Labor (Private)	0.030 (0.042)	-0.065 (0.056)	0.081** (0.031)	-0.029 (0.035)
Labor (Public)	0.035** (0.012)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.007 (0.008)
Fiscal	-0.005 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)
Debt	-0.010 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.012* (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
Poverty	0.058* (0.027)	0.063 (0.050)	0.081** (0.029)	-0.029 (0.027)
Social	-0.062 ⁺ (0.037)	-0.029 (0.031)	-0.079* (0.035)	0.015 (0.014)
Waiver	-0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)
Growth	0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.008* (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)
ln(Population)	-0.337 (0.211)	-0.786 (0.522)	-0.424 (0.333)	0.201 (0.425)
ln(GDP)	-0.204 ⁺ (0.123)	0.103* (0.046)	-0.308* (0.120)	-0.035 (0.037)
Polity	0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)
Observations	144	145	144	145
Pseudo R ²	0.221	0.203	0.226	0.191

Note: These estimates are from fractional outcome probit regression models. The dependent variable is the rate of emigration from j in Year t . All independent variables pertain to borrowing country j in Year $t - 1$ or $t - 2$ as indicated in the second row of the table. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

A.8 An Alternative Explanation: Migrant Lobbying

In this section, we consider the plausibility of migrant lobbying as an alternative explanation: the large diaspora populations in G5 countries may lobby their host government to help their home country through IMF lending. First, we note that including country fixed effects in our main models absorbs the first-year values of migrants in the G5 countries, allowing us to exploit the within-country variation in *G5 Migrants* in predicting $\ln(\text{Loan Size})$. Migrants need time to settle and obtain voting rights before they can exert political pressure on G5 policymakers to grant larger loans to their home countries. In addition, migrant voting rights are largely limited in the G5 countries, and within-country changes in *G5 Migrants* are unlikely to reflect the growth of migrant electorates in the short run. In addition, since the Mexican migration to the US during this period was largely driven by illegal border crossings, this exemplifies the impact of growing migrant pressure—instead of migrant lobbying—on IMF lending behavior.

Second, we perform a mediation analysis to separate the effect of long-term migrants from the effect of more recent migrants on loan size. Given that long-term migrants are more likely to have political influence in their host states even in the absence of formal voting rights, our mediation analysis captures the direct effect of long-term G5 migrants (i.e., migrant lobbying) as well as their indirect effect through the volume of more recent migrants (i.e., migrant pressure) on loan size. Following Altonji and Card (1991), we use G5 migrants in 1960 as an indicator of long-term migrants. Table A17 shows that there is no direct effect of long-term migrants on loan size. Its effect on loan size is only mediated through G5 migrants in the year preceding IMF loan commitments.

Finally, we have looked into (1) LobbyView (Kim 2018) to see if migrant groups in the US have lobbied on IMF-related bills introduced in Congress;⁴⁰ and (2) qualitative information on migrant lobbying in several European G5 countries. While migrant groups have pressured the policymakers of their host countries on immigration and trade issues,

⁴⁰See Table A18 in the appendix for the results from LobbyView.

Table A17: Mediation Analysis

		(A57)
Dependent Variable:		<i>G5 Migrants</i>
	G5 Migrants (1960)	0.800** (0.289)
Dependent Variable:		<i>ln(Loan Size)</i>
	G5 Migrants _{t-1}	0.714*** (0.203)
	G5 Migrants (1960)	-0.025 (0.333)
	GDP Growth _{t-1}	-0.004 (0.007)
	G5 Migrants _{t-1} × GDP Growth _{t-1}	-0.042* (0.020)
	ln(Popuation) _{t-1}	0.528*** (0.083)
	ln(GDP) _{t-1}	0.229** (0.073)
	Polity _{t-1}	0.036*** (0.010)
	Observations	723
	Countries	117

Note: This table displays results from a structural equation model. The dependent variable in the first equation is *G5 Migrants*. The dependent variable in the second equation is *ln(Loan Size)*. Standard errors are clustered on borrowing country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.

we find that international lending to migrants' home countries does not appear to be a top policy priority.

If the migrant lobbying mechanism is present, we should observe migrant groups offering donations toward host-country legislation relating to the IMF, such as increasing the Fund's resources. We investigated this within the US by searching through the Lobbyview database (Kim 2018) which contains detailed reports on the congressional bills and issue areas that US interest groups lobbied for under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. Using Lobbyview's database, we identified a total of 16 ethnic lobby groups in the US from nine different sending countries, including China, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines. Using the individual lobbying reports, as well as by looking into the mission statements posted on these groups' websites,

we describe the general interests and lobbying efforts of each of these groups in Table A18.

Notably, we did not find that any of these ethnic lobby groups lobbied on issues pertaining to the Fund or other international lending organizations, such as the World Bank. Instead, the top issue areas typically included US immigration policy and trade-related issues. For instance, lobby groups, such as the Business Councils of India, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, primarily lobbied for better trade relations between the US and their home country. A Mexican-American lobby group, the National Council of La Raza, lobbied for a great number of bills that would make the living experience of Mexican immigrants in the US more bearable.⁴¹ Furthermore, the National Council of La Raza also lobbied \$177,663 in the year 2010 towards bills such as 111 S279, which was a bill to amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, to cancel the removal of certain undocumented students who have been long term residents of the US and entered the country when they were children. These bills that were supported by the National Council of La Raza, show that their biggest concerns were those topics centered around immigration, but not the relation of Mexico to the IMF.

Trade and immigration also feature as key policy concerns for diaspora groups in other G5 countries, including the UK, France, and Germany. In the UK, the British Indian diaspora, which constitutes the country's largest foreign-born population and ethnic minority, has actively lobbied on Anglo-Indian issues related to trade, migration, and foreign affairs, with no evidence of lobbying on international lending policies. Representing over 1.5 million votes in the UK elections, British Indians fundraise for Indian political parties, consult on campaigns, provide grass-roots mobilization, and lobby on foreign policies related to their home countries. These policy priorities underlined the lobbying efforts and electoral support for the Brexit "Leave" vote by nearly 40 percent of British Indians, making this group between 1.6 and 2 times more likely to support the UK's separation from

⁴¹For example, the National Council of La Raza lobbied \$340,000 in support of bill 110 H 1909 in the year 2007, that would increase the number of Federal judgeships in certain districts to help with the overload of criminal immigration court cases.

Table A18: A Snapshot of Migrant Lobbying in the US

Organization Name	Origin Country	Dollar Amount Lobbied	Bills/Lobbying Activity
<i>US Guatemala Business Council</i>	Guatemala	\$740,000 (2018-2020)	2019 State and Foreign Ops Appropriations Bill; Promote US-Guatemalan economic relations; Border security
<i>Insight Cuba</i>	Cuba	\$20,000 (2012, Q3)	Person-to-person OFAC license renewals
<i>Korean International Trade Association</i>	S. Korea	\$330,000 (2009-2010)	KORUS-Free Trade agreement
<i>Dominican Republic-US Business Council</i>	Dominican Rep.	\$360,000 (2003-2006)	"Bi-lateral Trade Agreement and other issues"; CAFTA
<i>Chinese American Citizens Alliance</i>	China	\$26,750 (2018)	H.R. 2358: Chinese American World War II Veterans Congressional Gold Medal Act
<i>Sugar Alliance Of The Philippines</i>	Philippines	\$0	"Legislation affecting the US sugar program"; Trade preferences; Anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations
<i>Confederation Of Garment Exporters Of The Philippines</i>	Philippines	\$50,000 (2012-2013)	SAVE ACT (H.R. 2387 / S. 1244)
<i>Servipronto de El Salvador S.A.</i>	El Salvador	N/A	Legal disputes between El Salvador and McDonalds involving franchises
<i>CAMTEX</i>	El Salvador	\$20,000 (2016, Q4)	Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership
<i>Association of Mexican Tomato Growers</i>	Mexico	\$90,000 (2020, Q2)	Issues relating to the Tomatoes Suspension Agreement
<i>Cuban American Foundation</i>	Cuba	\$489,409 (1999-2002)	Cuba-related Legislation; Human rights
<i>Cuba Democracy Public Advocacy, Corp.</i>	Cuba	\$80,000 (2015-2016)	Build bipartisan support for Cuba's pro-democracy movement; Oppose efforts to unilaterally ease sanctions against Cuba's dictatorship;
<i>American Coalition for Filipino Veterans</i>	Philippines	\$460,000 (1999-2008)	Supported the Cuban Airport Security Act of 2016 (HR 5728 and S 3289)
<i>National Council of La Raza</i>	Mexico	\$3,191,506 (2011-2020)	110 S 671. Benefits for Filipino veterans. Would exempt children of certain Filipino World War II Veterans from visa limitations
<i>Mexican American Legal Defense Fund</i>	Mexico	\$1,390,072 (1999-2018)	Most lobby efforts devoted toward immigration policy. Large amounts of money given towards bills that are related to Homeland Security and Citizenship and Immigration Services
<i>US-India Business Council</i>	India	\$365,000 (2006-2015)	Issues related to education and civil liberties; Immigration reform; No Child Left Behind
			Strengthening trade ties with the US and India; Immigration

the EU when compared to the minority groups of Black Caribbeans, Africans, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis Leidig (2019). The “Leave” vote reflected the Indian diaspora’s hope that Brexit Britain would expand its markets with the Commonwealth in order to increase trade and open up more opportunities for Indian local businesses in the UK. Importantly, the diaspora’s support for the “Leave” option demonstrated British Indians’ opposition to the EU’s freedom of movement clause—a clause that is considered unjust to Commonwealth migrants who face substantial difficulties in the visa application process despite their colonial ties to the UK.

In other cases, the diaspora’s lobbying efforts—across wide-ranging policy measures—encounter political resistance by the migrant-hosting state’s government. In France, attempts by the sizable Algerian diaspora to influence the French Government’s foreign policy measures related to Algeria’s domestic politics have been consistently met with a stance of “non-interference” by France’s political leadership. This stance reflects the sensitive diplomatic relations between the two countries, primarily due to the continued refusal by French leaders to formally apologize for France’s decades-long colonialization of Algeria. In 2019 for instance, Algerian diaspora’s demands that the French government objected to the fifth re-election bid by Algeria’s 82-year-old authoritarian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, were met with refusals to “interfere” and claims of Algeria being a “sovereign country” by France’s Prime Minister Edouard Philippe (Elizabeth Bryant March 8, 2019).

Similarly, lobbying efforts by the Turkish diaspora in Germany have focused primarily on domestic issues that concern immigrants’ lives in Germany, such as equal opportunity in education and job market, religious issues and rights, social and cultural matters, demand for anti-discrimination law, and demand for more political rights, particularly since the 1980s (Oner 2014; Ögelman 2003). The most visible homeland-related matter that Turkish immigrants have lobbied for until recently is Turkey’s EU accession, and the economic benefits of EU membership (Sezgin 2008). There are numerous Turkish

associations in Germany that focus on economic and business-related issues, which lobby for improvement of trade and economic relations between Germany and Turkey, as well as easing visa restrictions for Turkish businessmen and representing the interests of business of Turkish origin in Germany (Amelina and Faist 2008). These groups do not have any particular preferences regarding the economic policies directed at Turkey; they primarily focus on macro issues, such as improving economic relations between the two countries and Turkey’s EU candidacy. The primary avenue of deliberation in the Bundestag has been through the MPs of Turkish descent listed in Table A19.⁴²

Table A19: Bundestag Representatives of Turkish Descent, 1987-2009

Year	MP Name
1987	Sevim Çelebi
1994-1998	Leyla Onur & Cem Özdemir
1998-2002	Leyla Onur & Cem Özdemir & Ekin Deligöz
2002-2005	Cem Özdemir & Ekin Deligöz & Lale Akgün
2005-2009	Ekin Deligöz & Lale Akgün & Hakkı Keskin

To evaluate the scope of migrant lobbying in Germany, we traced the Bundestag speeches of the aforementioned MPs between 1999 and 2005, during which Turkey borrowed heavily from the IMF. After filtering all Bundestag speeches containing “Türkei,” we then searched for macro economy-related keywords such as economy, finance/financial, trade and context-related keywords such as customs union, loan/lend/credit, business, and IMF. We then translated the speeches containing these keywords into English to search for any indication of economic issues and relations with Turkey. As mentioned earlier, apart from the emphasis on the potential economic benefits of Turkey’s EU membership for both Turkey and Germany, we did not find any reference to Turkey’s IMF programs. Moreover, scholars point out that Turkish migrant organizations do not have significant bargaining power with vis-à-vis the German government (Yurdakul 2006). and have not managed to be effective at the federal level (Oner 2014; Sezgin 2008). One of the main reasons why they have not been able to become a powerful group has to do with its ideo-

⁴²Only MPs between 1987 and 2009 are included as Turkey has not had an IMF program since 2009.

logical heterogeneity; there are notable differences between more conservative right-wing and left-wing groups within the Turkish diaspora community (Yurdakul 2009).

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