

Appendix

Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrices

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Vote for Sanctions	0.566	0.496	0	1	1713
ln(Migrant Stock _{ij})	7.374	3.023	0	11.701	1713
Migrants _{ij} as % of Population _i	0.039	0.083	0	0.698	1713
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Migrant Stock _i	0.456	0.882	0	4.964	1713
ln(Transit Stock _i)	10.799	2.612	4.707	13.727	640
Composite Migrants (standardized)	-0.012	1.341	-0.988	4.073	1713
ln(Border Detections _{ij})	1.14	1.812	0	6.485	1713
Libya Bill	0.374	0.484	0	1	1713
Iran Bill	0.3	0.458	0	1	1713
Population _i	38.281	28.689	0.415	81.777	1713
Unemployment _i	10.281	5.536	5	26.5	1713
Real GDP Growth _i	1.312	1.826	-5.939	5.691	1713
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	2790.64	955.403	373.986	5343.777	1713
Former Colony _{ij}	0.071	0.256	0	1	1713
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i	2.477	0.204	1.798	2.986	1713
RWP Vote Share _i	5.704	6.328	0	28.2	1713
Personal Income Tax _i	8.602	3.645	2.769	28.168	1522
Welfare Tax _i	12.628	3.663	0.33	18.604	1522
Exports to Origin Country (% GDP _i)	0	0.001	0	0.008	1699
Imports from Origin Country (% GDP _i)	0	0	0	0.002	1699
ln(Refugees _{ij})	4.964	2.541	0.693	9.75	1621
ln(Remittance Outflows _{ij})	2.312	1.468	0	4.871	1576

Additional Results

Table A2: Migrant Stocks and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)	(A6)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	-0.109** (0.034)	-0.200* (0.086)	-0.231* (0.099)	-0.194* (0.089)	-0.243+ (0.129)	-0.332** (0.107)
Libya Bill	3.786*** (0.316)	4.002*** (0.410)	3.966*** (0.335)	3.697*** (0.416)	3.778*** (0.402)	3.221*** (0.497)
Iran Bill	3.726*** (0.389)	3.764*** (0.377)	3.619*** (0.417)	3.668*** (0.395)	3.862*** (0.404)	3.414*** (0.303)
Population _i	-0.001 (0.004)	0.286 (0.216)	0.414+ (0.229)	0.247 (0.211)	0.396 (0.248)	0.759* (0.310)
Unemployment _i	-0.053* (0.021)	-0.096* (0.047)	-0.068 (0.057)	-0.027 (0.057)	-0.114+ (0.065)	-0.133* (0.063)
Real GDP Growth _i	0.010 (0.062)	0.088 (0.096)	0.127 (0.113)	-0.023 (0.128)	0.127 (0.139)	0.025 (0.125)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	0.000* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001+ (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.191 (0.181)	0.413 (0.406)	0.880** (0.317)	0.451 (0.587)	0.913* (0.360)	1.283** (0.492)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i	0.103 (0.254)					
RWP Vote Share _i		-0.069 (0.044)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP _i)			250.045 (202.548)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP _i)			-834.396 (532.524)			
Personal Income Tax _i				-0.311 (0.254)		
Welfare Tax _i				0.001 (0.591)		
$\ln(\text{Refugees}_{ij})$					-0.010 (0.155)	
$\ln(\text{Remittance Outflows}_{ij})$						-0.278 (0.194)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MEP Country Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1699	1522	1615	1576

Table A2 This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A4: Migrant Share of MEP Country Population and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)	(A18)	(A19)	(A20)	(A21)	(A22)	(A23)	(A24)	(A25)
Migrants as % of Population _i	-0.444 (0.770)	-2.369** (0.804)	-3.737* (1.567)	-4.234*** (0.957)	-5.024*** (1.505)	-2.679*** (0.489)	-5.543*** (1.251)	-4.744** (1.768)	-6.106*** (1.660)	-3.693* (1.812)	-5.476*** (1.512)
Libya Bill		3.012*** (0.270)	3.135*** (0.287)	3.820*** (0.320)	3.867*** (0.391)	3.972*** (0.328)	4.041*** (0.421)	4.022*** (0.373)	3.524*** (0.438)	3.694*** (0.454)	3.278*** (0.484)
Iran Bill		3.324*** (0.355)	3.499*** (0.376)	4.092*** (0.390)	4.632*** (0.513)	3.889*** (0.380)	4.712*** (0.493)	4.546*** (0.564)	4.880*** (0.456)	5.240*** (0.583)	4.870*** (0.475)
EPP				2.250* (0.961)	2.191* (0.939)	2.342* (0.925)	2.181* (0.959)	2.168* (0.957)	2.279* (1.018)	2.184* (0.963)	1.969* (0.995)
S&D				2.220* (0.978)	2.165* (0.958)	2.349* (0.938)	2.170* (0.981)	2.141* (0.976)	2.249* (1.033)	2.106* (0.989)	1.982* (1.011)
Greens/EFA				-0.809 (0.966)	-0.884 (0.949)	-0.675 (0.907)	-0.814 (0.982)	-0.865 (0.970)	-0.681 (1.034)	-1.007 (0.974)	-0.919 (0.979)
ALDE/ADLE				2.377* (1.006)	2.354* (0.992)	2.494** (0.947)	2.355* (1.006)	2.272* (1.002)	2.496* (1.078)	2.249* (1.020)	2.143* (1.026)
ECR				4.118*** (1.018)	4.011*** (0.990)	4.205*** (1.022)	4.026*** (0.998)	4.017*** (0.986)	4.216*** (1.036)	3.961*** (1.010)	3.845*** (1.008)
EFDD				0.201 (0.956)	0.094 (0.898)	0.329 (0.918)	0.107 (0.930)	0.082 (0.926)	0.113 (0.954)	-0.087 (0.899)	-0.174 (0.922)
GUE-NGL				-0.947 (1.238)	-0.985 (1.207)	-0.671 (1.117)	-0.947 (1.253)	-0.967 (1.228)	-0.817 (1.322)	-1.288 (1.275)	-0.858 (1.276)
Population _i					0.026 (0.163)	-0.007+ (0.003)	-0.013 (0.131)	0.075 (0.155)	-0.059 (0.102)	-0.006 (0.173)	0.121 (0.169)
Unemployment _i					-0.097 (0.062)	-0.040+ (0.022)	-0.102* (0.042)	-0.063 (0.055)	-0.024 (0.050)	-0.094 (0.065)	-0.100 (0.069)
Real GDP Growth _i					0.144 (0.109)	0.054 (0.065)	0.116 (0.084)	0.180+ (0.103)	-0.019 (0.120)	0.196+ (0.113)	0.130 (0.114)
Distance (weighted) _{i,j}					-0.000 (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Former Colony _{i,j}					0.567*** (0.204)	0.035 (0.194)	0.032 (0.303)	0.620** (0.209)	0.245 (0.427)	0.603** (0.207)	0.677*** (0.202)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i						-0.069 (0.217)					
RWP Vote Share _i							-0.112* (0.049)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP _i)								149.525 (231.972)			
Imports _{ij} (%GDP _i)								-927.621+ (486.332)			
Personal Income Tax _i									-0.462+ (0.247)		
Welfare Tax _i									0.002 (0.607)		
Refugees as % of Population _i										-30.779 (21.013)	
ln(Remittance Outflows _{ij})											-0.193 (0.179)
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713	1699	1522	1615	1576
MEP Country Fixed Effects			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table A4 This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. For all party fixed effects, NI is the baseline. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A6: Migrant Stocks and the Proportion Votes for Sanctions by MEP Country

	(A37)	(A38)	(A39)	(A40)	(A41)	(A42)	(A43)	(A44)	(A45)	(A46)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	-0.101* (0.051)	-0.098** (0.035)	-0.143* (0.063)	-0.176* (0.072)	-0.145* (0.067)	-0.155* (0.073)	-0.194* (0.083)	-0.157* (0.063)	-0.209+ (0.121)	-0.409*** (0.078)
Libya Bill		3.274*** (0.273)	3.450*** (0.302)	3.438*** (0.386)	3.450*** (0.320)	3.442*** (0.378)	3.349*** (0.411)	3.181*** (0.429)	3.392*** (0.541)	2.792*** (0.435)
Iran Bill		2.885*** (0.303)	2.928*** (0.282)	2.927*** (0.314)	2.851*** (0.268)	3.147*** (0.347)	3.059*** (0.332)	2.909*** (0.438)	2.921*** (0.470)	1.986*** (0.438)
Population _i				0.100 (0.268)	0.004 (0.006)	0.070 (0.231)	0.185 (0.223)	0.208 (0.255)	0.190 (0.287)	0.994*** (0.293)
Unemployment _i				-0.105+ (0.054)	-0.067+ (0.035)	-0.103* (0.048)	-0.072 (0.054)	-0.031 (0.049)	-0.123+ (0.065)	-0.144* (0.066)
Real GDP Growth _i				0.028 (0.103)	-0.013 (0.073)	0.031 (0.085)	0.090 (0.114)	-0.094 (0.111)	0.105 (0.107)	0.022 (0.116)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}				0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}				0.545 (0.428)	0.010 (0.303)	0.071 (0.370)	0.680+ (0.360)	0.045 (0.473)	0.625 (0.464)	1.559** (0.492)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i										
RWP Vote Share _i						-0.098* (0.042)				
Exports _{ij} (% GDP _i)							211.248 (165.242)			
Imports _{ij} (% GDP _i)							-940.512* (422.976)			
Personal Income Tax _i								-0.330 (0.219)		
Welfare Tax _i								-0.309 (0.370)		
$\ln(\text{Refugees}_{ij})$									0.066 (0.159)	
$\ln(\text{Remittances Outflows}_{ij})$										-0.295 (0.219)
MEP Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	83	83	83	83	83	83	80	66	71	69

Table A6 This table portrays estimates using fractional logit regression. The dependent variable is the proportion of MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, .5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A7: Migrant Stocks and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament (Mixed Effects)

	(A47)	(A48)	(A49)	(A50)	(A51)	(A52)	(A53)	(A54)
ln(Migrant Stock) _{ij}	-0.074* (0.031)	-0.147*** (0.040)	-0.112** (0.043)	-0.092* (0.042)	-0.113* (0.046)	-0.084+ (0.043)	-0.177** (0.065)	-0.073 (0.049)
Libya Bill	3.672*** (0.197)	3.025*** (0.198)	3.789*** (0.228)	3.836*** (0.228)	3.848*** (0.245)	3.642*** (0.243)	3.820*** (0.241)	3.695*** (0.241)
Iran Bill	3.866*** (0.197)	3.340*** (0.240)	3.745*** (0.259)	3.749*** (0.253)	3.686*** (0.275)	3.493*** (0.280)	3.662*** (0.282)	3.598*** (0.260)
EPP	2.231*** (0.301)		2.226*** (0.304)	2.164*** (0.303)	2.161*** (0.307)	2.243*** (0.307)	2.235*** (0.309)	1.995*** (0.309)
S&D	2.226*** (0.306)		2.248*** (0.309)	2.174*** (0.309)	2.180*** (0.312)	2.244*** (0.314)	2.221*** (0.313)	2.047*** (0.313)
Greens /EFA	-0.677+ (0.353)		-0.784* (0.354)	-0.816* (0.352)	-0.791* (0.358)	-0.630+ (0.356)	-0.913* (0.363)	-0.778* (0.358)
ALDE / ADLE	2.399*** (0.356)		2.344*** (0.358)	2.278*** (0.358)	2.231*** (0.360)	2.420*** (0.371)	2.260*** (0.367)	2.129*** (0.362)
ECR	4.251*** (0.796)		4.157*** (0.799)	4.042*** (0.799)	4.092*** (0.800)	4.152*** (0.802)	4.135*** (0.809)	3.887*** (0.800)
EFDD	0.165 (0.438)		0.243 (0.454)	0.161 (0.451)	0.178 (0.457)	0.320 (0.467)	0.131 (0.468)	0.007 (0.467)
GUE-NGL	-0.895* (0.378)		-0.806* (0.384)	-0.849* (0.377)	-0.840* (0.386)	-0.704+ (0.385)	-1.121** (0.400)	-0.630 (0.395)
Population _i		0.001 (0.004)						
Unemployment _i		-0.059** (0.020)						
Real GDP Growth _i		0.045 (0.051)						
Distance (weighted) _{ij}		0.000 (0.000)						
Former Colony _{ij}		0.371 (0.312)						
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i								
RWP Vote Share _i								
Exports _{ij} (% GDP) _i								
Imports _{ij} (% GDP) _i								
Personal Income Tax _i								
Welfare Tax _i								
ln((Refugees) _{ij})								
ln(Remittance Outflows _{ij})								
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1699	1522	1621	1576
					112.240 (162.735) -294.947 (315.722)			
						-0.031 (0.025) -0.026 (0.025)		
							0.095 (0.072)	
								-0.125 (0.092)

Table A7 This table portrays estimates using mixed-effects logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. For all party fixed effects, NI is the baseline. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, .1, .5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A8: Mediation Analysis - Migration and Right-Wing Populism

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	(A55) <i>RWP Vote Share</i>	(A56) <i>Pro-Sanctions Vote</i>
ln(Migrant Stock _{ij})	0.758* (0.291)	-0.092** (0.035)
RWP Vote Share _i		-0.019+ (0.010)
Libya Bill	2.414 (1.607)	3.836*** (0.324)
Iran Bill	0.883 (1.77)	3.749*** (0.393)
Population _i	-0.099* (0.038)	-0.002 (0.004)
Unemployment _i	-0.237 (0.147)	-0.057** (0.020)
Real GDP Growth _i	-0.668 (0.460)	-0.002 (0.061)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.0002* (0.0001)
Former Colony _{ij}	-2.066 (2.119)	0.128 (0.170)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713

Table A8 Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A9: Mediation Analysis - Migration and Remittances

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	(A57) <i>ln(Remittances)</i>	(A58) <i>Pro-Sanctions Vote</i>
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	0.203 ⁺ (0.106)	-0.068* (0.032)
$\ln(\text{Remittances}_{ij})$		-0.125** (0.048)
Libya Bill	-0.040 (0.356)	3.700*** (0.322)
Iran Bill	-0.494 (0.315)	3.579*** (0.385)
Population _i	0.026** (0.007)	0.003 (0.004)
Unemployment _i	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.051* (0.021)
Real GDP Growth _i	-0.086 (0.088)	0.023 (0.070)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	0.00007 (0.0002)	0.0003* (0.0001)
Former Colony _{ij}	-0.230 (0.317)	0.199 (0.169)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	1576	1576

Table A9 Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A10: Border Detections and the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(A59)	(A60)	(A61)	(A62)	(A63)
$\ln(\text{Border Detections}_{ij})$	-0.056 (0.047)	-0.026 (0.056)	0.027 (0.213)	0.109 (0.149)	0.383 ⁺ (0.230)
Libya Bill		3.041*** (0.268)	3.184*** (0.284)	3.885*** (0.306)	4.568*** (0.448)
Iran Bill		3.176*** (0.347)	3.285*** (0.376)	3.844*** (0.411)	3.353*** (0.528)
Population _i					-0.020 (0.135)
Unemployment _i					-0.036 (0.052)
Real GDP Growth _i					0.151 (0.108)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}					0.001* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}					0.137 (0.188)
Party Fixed Effects				✓	✓
MEP's Country Fixed Effects			✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1713	1713	1713

Table A10 This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A11: Effects of Sanctions on Emigration (1950-2005)

	(A64)	(A65)	(A66)	(A67)	(A68)
Sanctions Imposed $_{i,t-1}$	0.604*** (0.155)	0.240* (0.100)	0.552** (0.172)	0.002 (0.164)	0.007 (0.158)
Sanctions Imposed $_{i,t-2}$	0.337** (0.119)	0.189+ (0.099)	0.303* (0.124)	0.313* (0.123)	0.234+ (0.125)
Sanctions Imposed $_{i,t-3}$	0.585** (0.193)	0.287* (0.121)	0.609** (0.202)	0.235 (0.192)	0.228+ (0.119)
GDP per Capita $_{i,t-1}$				0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Population $_{i,t-1}$				0.000* (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)
Polity $_{i,t-1}$				0.021 (0.023)	-0.063+ (0.037)
Constant	9.047*** (0.222)	9.477*** (0.158)	9.398*** (0.237)	9.349*** (0.206)	9.859*** (0.702)
Country Fixed Effects		✓			✓
Year Fixed Effects			✓		✓
Observations	2958	2958	2958	2146	2146
Countries	122	122	122	97	97

Note: This table portrays estimates using OLS regression. The dependent variable is (logged) emigration out of country i at time t . Standard errors are clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

Figure A1: Mediation Analysis (Effect of Migrant Stock through Right-Wing Populist Vote Share)




Fig. A1 This figure illustrates results of the mediation analysis for *RWP Vote Share* and displays the total effect, direct effect, and average causal mediation effect (ACME) with 90% confidence intervals.

Figure A2: Mediation Analysis (Effect of Migrant Stock through Remittances)




Fig. A2 This figure illustrates results of the mediation analysis for $\ln(\text{Remittances})$ and displays the total effect, direct effect, and average causal mediation effect (ACME) with 90% confidence intervals.

Figure A3: Marginal Effect of Migrant Stocks Across Levels of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment




Fig. A3 This figure displays the marginal effect of (logged) migrant stocks across levels of anti-immigrant sentiment for a MEP country with migrant stock at its mean. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other covariates are also held at their mean

An Alternative Explanation: Migrant Lobbying and Economic Sanctions

One may argue that the lobbying influence of diasporas can induce policymakers to oppose economic sanctions. Considering the damage of sanctions inflicted upon the target country, migrants who maintain close contact with their home countries may lobby against economic sanctions. The literature on diaspora politics has shown that powerful ethnic lobbies often shape the foreign policies of their host states (Ambrosio 2002; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). This lobbying mechanism is another channel through which a large migrant stock can drive the foreign aid policy of a state (Bermeo and Leblang 2015).

We argue that this alternative mechanism has little merit in studying the link between migration and economic sanctions. First, the anecdotal evidence and public opinion data suggest that migrants tend to *support* sanctions on their home countries run by dictators. If sanctions are often placed due to a country's humanitarian failures and a broader disregard for the international community, then there are valid reasons why migrants of the target country would wish to express discontent with the regime.²⁴

Second, migrants' political influence is limited when they are not citizens of host states. Although some member states of the European Union grant electoral rights to non-citizen legal immigrants, immigrants generally have few electoral privileges in major destinations like Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. This variation within the EU is largely due to electoral reform efforts during the 1970s, and in the early 1990s. The 1970s saw multiple European countries considering how they should give electoral rights to non-citizen residents, including EU nationals and third-country nationals who come from

²⁴For instance, see Shain (1994); Vanderbush (2009) for Cuban Americans' support for sanctions against Castro's regime and Grenier and Gladwin (2014); Osorio (2013) for more recent public opinion research on Cuban American attitudes toward Cuba. However, there is significant cross-group variation in diaspora support for their home countries. For instance, Syrian diasporas in Latin America still show support for the Assad regime (Baeza and Pinto 2016).

outside of Europe. In the 1990s, the EU began to develop legal frameworks that would define what it means to be a “citizen” of the EU. This was also part of a broader effort to further institutionalize the EU across its various state members.²⁵

What is the current status of electoral rights for non-citizen residents in the EU? Among the 29 European states, only 17 grant some electoral rights to non-citizen residents to vote in local elections. Moreover, even though these 17 countries allow some non-citizens to vote, there is still a wide variation in the de facto electoral rights, and how residence status is attained. For example, Spain and Portugal only allow electoral rights on a reciprocity basis, meaning foreigners only gain voting rights when their country of origin also allows the Spanish and the Portuguese to have electoral rights. The other 12 European states do not allow for non-citizens to vote in any local elections. It is therefore extremely unlikely that migrants—especially ones from non-EU countries—can affect policy outcomes regarding their own home country.²⁶

Third, even if migrants have voting power through acquired citizenship, citizenship acquisitions are such a small share of the total migrant community that they cannot exert much influence on policymakers and political outcomes. This is especially true for EU countries with restrictive citizenship regimes. For instance, in 2013, Italy had a Libyan migrant stock of 38,000, and of that stock, only 111 Libyan migrants since 2006 have naturalized to become Italian citizens. This subset of Italian citizens of Libyan origin since 2006 constitutes only about a 0.3% citizenship share of total Libyan migrants residing in Italy. In Malta, there is a relatively higher citizenship acquisition share among Libyan

²⁵All information on the history of electoral rights in the EU derived from Day and Shaw (2002) and Groenendijk (2008).

²⁶To measure this lobbying mechanism, Bermeo and Leblang (2015) use the status of migrants’ dual citizenship and voting rights in destination countries. While their dataset covers years up to 2008, ours begins in 2010, therefore making their particular measures unusable in this dataset for testing said mechanism.

migrants—approximately 10%—but this still represents a extremely small voting base.²⁷

Details of the EU Sanctions Bills in the Dataset

Syria

In 2011, the European Parliament voted on a Joint Motion for a Resolution regarding the civil war in Syria (European Parliament 2011). The Syrian Civil War erupted from localized pro-democracy protests in March of 2011, which quickly evolved into nationwide protests calling for the resignation of Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad. As the government and opposition began to take up arms, the protests soon transformed into a bloody civil war and humanitarian crisis. The war has been notable in both its human cost and international attention. According to UN estimates, the Syrian war had left at least 250,000 dead and 12 million displaced due to conflict. The conflict garnered attention from major states and various international organizations due to war crimes committed by both sides, the employment of chemical weapons, and the presence of jihadist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS).

In response, on June 23, 2011, the European Council adopted legislation to impose comprehensive sanctions on the Syrian regime. MEPs later vocalized their viewpoints on the Council decision in a Joint Resolution on July 5, 2011, with a bill affirming the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Syria and

“...to suspend all preparations for new bilateral cooperation programmes, to suspend the ongoing bilateral programmes with the Syrian authorities under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the MEDA instrument, to invite the European Investment Bank (EIB) not to approve new financing operations in Syria for the time being, to consider suspending further Community assistance to Syria in light of developments and not to take further steps with regard to the Association Agreement with Syria...” (Section 9)

²⁷All data on migrant shares taken from Eurostat (2017).

The wording of the resolution explicitly indicates the extensive nature of proposed restrictive measures with potential effects on the civilian population through the suspension of development finance, trade initiatives, and foreign credit to public and private financial institutions. EU sanctions on Syria also include an energy embargo on oil and petroleum products that comprised a large portion of Syrian exports to Europe (Portela 2012; Walker 2016). Given both the comprehensiveness of EU sanctions toward Syria and the high-profile nature of the conflict, it is worth asking whether domestic political considerations over immigration has led to any reluctance among MEPs to support the Council's measures.

Iran

Restrictive measures are also a key component of EU foreign policy toward Iran and nuclear proliferation. In response to Iran's nuclear program and Iran's defiance of previous UN resolutions, the Council issued economic sanctions against Iran in January of 2012. In addition to freezing assets of Iran's central bank and restricting the trade of precious metals, these new restrictive measures most notably included an "unprecedented" embargo on Iranian petroleum and crude oil (Blair 2012). The goal of these measures was to reopen negotiations with the Iranian government in hopes of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear military capability. The World Bank estimates Iranian exports shrunk by \$17.1 billion or roughly 13.5% between 2012-2014, with the most heavily affected sectors being oil, automobiles, construction, and finance (Devarajan and Mottaghi 2015).

An interim plan was soon reached in November of 2013 between Iran and major European powers, which would later morph into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) to limit Iran's nuclear development in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions. The European Parliament voiced their opinions toward the matter in a 2014 Joint Motion for Resolution (European Parliament 2014). This bill called for a gradual *lifting* of comprehensive economic sanctions on Iran and voiced approval for the Council's

January 2014 Joint Plan of Action that grants Iran partial relief from the sanctions. The European Parliament bill further implores that all nuclear-related sanctions toward Iran should be gradually be removed upon reaching a comprehensive agreement ensuring a peaceful Iranian nuclear program (Section 3). Moreover, the bill explicitly refers to the collateral damage on Iran's civilian population, stating that the European Parliament

“...is concerned about the possible outbreak of infectious diseases such as polio and measles, especially among children, and urges the EU to ease access to relevant medication which has otherwise been difficult to obtain because of the sanctions.” (Section 6)

Libya

Our last bill deals with contemporary EU sanctions toward Libya. In 2015, the European Parliament voted on a 2015 Joint Motion for a Resolution involving the situation in Libya, which states support for UNSC Resolution 2171, which “broadens the existing international sanctions on Libya to include the criminal responsibility of people who engage in or support acts that “threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct the successful completion of its political transition” (Paragraph 12). The wording of the resolution underscores the more targeted nature of sanctions toward Libya relative to both Syria and Iran. However, the UNSC sanctions referred to in the Libya bill have also included a range of restrictive measures aimed at Libyan institutions crucial toward public infrastructure such as “the Central Banks of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Foreign Bank, and the Libyan Investment Portfolio” (Carisch and Rickard-Martin 2011, p. 4).

Interactive Effects of Anti-Immigrant Forces

In this section, we consider some interactive effects concurrent with the recent literature on migration. First, the relationship between support for sanctions and migration may depend on the level of right-wing populism in a country. While unwanted immigration pressure

from targeted sanctions countries can shape the sanctions decisions independently, some policymakers are more politically susceptible to this pressure. Particularly, policymakers of countries with growing right-wing populism may seek to curb immigration to exclude right-wing populist parties from mainstream politics. It is well-established in the literature that right-wing populist parties often take over the issue ownership of immigration to garner votes (Arzheimer 2009; Eatwell 1998; Green et al. 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). These parties blame migrants for urban and economic crises, giving the migration issue increased saliency by emphasizing the potential domestic costs to their potential support base. Although immigration is not the only issue on the agenda of right-wing populist parties, it is usually a central one for their supporters. For instance, Eatwell (1998) notes that Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the National Front party in France, became more favorable to voters when he set an actual policy agenda on immigration.

To preempt the rise of right-wing populism, mainstream parties in the coalition may seek to decrease immigration issue saliency by restricting immigration (Meguid 2005). Policymakers may use policy tools other than immigration policy to achieve this goal. Refraining from imposing sanctions that could generate immigration inflows from the target country is one way to curb future immigration. Therefore, migration pressure can induce policymakers to oppose economic coercion even more vehemently when their countries experience substantial growth of right-wing populist parties.

HYPOTHESIS 1A: Right-wing populism increases the extent to which policymakers oppose economic sanctions on a migrant-sending country.

We also look at the potential effect of heightened anti-immigrant sentiment in a country. Although an increasing right-wing populist vote share is an indicator of a growing negative public sentiment toward immigration, the absence of right-wing populism may not necessarily indicate the lack of public opposition to immigration. For instance, elec-

toral institutions may prevent anti-immigrant interests from materializing into organized political parties (Dancygier et al. 2015; Golder 2003), and the media may sensationalize increased immigration leading to heightened threat perception among natives (Hopkins 2010). Policymakers without a significant threat from right-wing populist parties may thus still try to increase their popularity by accommodating the policy preferences of anti-immigrant voters. When immigration creates a perception of labor market competition (Dancygier and Donnelly 2012), competition for resources (Dancygier 2010; Hanson et al. 2007), or ignite ethnocentric and prejudicial attitudes (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Kinder and Kam 2009), policymakers will respond to an increasing electoral base of those who prefer a closed immigration policy. In a country where such electoral base is present, policymakers whose countries are connected to a target country through a migrant network are even more likely to oppose economic sanctions.

HYPOTHESIS 1B: Anti-immigrant public opinions increase the extent to which policymakers oppose economic sanctions on a migrant-sending country.

Since the sanctions target countries tend to be poor, migrants from these countries could trigger other forms of economic anxiety among native voters. The public's belief that these migrants are net consumers of welfare can induce policymakers to become more wary of immigration inflows, especially when immigrants tend to be uneducated and unskilled. However, voters may not base their attitudes toward immigration on the level of welfare spending as long as they do not carry a heavy tax burden. When voters' contributions to the welfare system are substantial, policymakers can be held more accountable when the level of immigration increases. The previous scholarship has found some evidence that policymakers of welfare states tend to restrict low-skill immigration (Hanson et al. 2007; Peters 2017; Razin et al. 2011). As voters of welfare states worry about the possibility of welfare depletion by poor migrants, policymakers of welfare states may be more sensitive

to the connection between economic sanctions and migration.

HYPOTHESIS 1C: *Welfare taxation increases the extent to which policymakers oppose economic sanctions on a migrant-sending country.*

We now test Hypotheses 1A through 1C to assess whether certain contexts will further strengthen the relationship between migration and MEP voting on economic sanctions. Tables A12 and A13 display a series of models where we interact migrant stocks with: (1) The level of anti-immigrant popular sentiment; (2) The percentage of right-wing populist vote; and (3) The level of welfare taxation. For these interaction models, we maintain all types of fixed effects when possible and only the baseline of controls as in Model 10. We also test Hypotheses 1A through 1C using alternative measures of migrant stock. Models I1 through I3 use the same *Migrant Stock_{ij}* variable as in previous models. Models I4 through I6 instead operationalize migrant stocks from target country *j* as a percentage of the MEP country's total population. Lastly, Models I7 through I9 measure migrant stocks from target country *j* as a percentage of country *i*'s total migrant stock. For all of these models, our primary focus is with the significance of the interaction term. We are less concerned with interpreting the component term, *Migrant Stock_{ij}*, by itself since this coefficient often reflects out-of-sample observations.²⁸

Hypothesis 1A predicts that the association between immigration and MEP opposition to sanctions will increase to the extent that right-wing populist parties are present.

²⁸Two of our modifying variables—anti-immigrant sentiment and welfare taxation—have minimum values above zero. Hence, the coefficient for *Migrant Stock_{ij}* in these interaction models portrays the effect of migrant stock at nonsensical values of the modifying variable. Right-wing populist vote share does, however, take values of zero in our dataset. The coefficient of our migrant stock measure in these models remains negative and statistically significant.

Table A12: Conditional Effects of Migrant Stocks on the Probability of Voting for Sanctions in the European Parliament

	(I1)	(I2)	(I3)	(I4)	(I5)	(I6)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij})$	-0.217* (0.091)	-1.199** (0.459)	-0.137 (0.185)			
Migrants _{ij} as % of Population _i				-3.654** (1.300)	-30.517* (13.477)	-7.518* (3.112)
RWP Vote Share _i	-0.141 ⁺ (0.081)			-0.105* (0.050)		
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij}) \times \text{RWP Vote}_i$	0.009 (0.008)					
Migrants _{ij} as % of Pop. _i x RWP Vote _i				-0.319* (0.133)		
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i		-3.152* (1.455)			-0.572 ⁺ (0.302)	
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij}) \times \text{Anti-Immigrant Sentiment}_i$		0.452* (0.186)				
Migrants _{ij} as % of Pop. _i x Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i					11.785* (5.745)	
Welfare Tax _i			0.210 (0.531)			0.235 (0.535)
$\ln(\text{Migrant Stock}_{ij}) \times \text{Welfare Tax}_i$			-0.007 (0.014)			
Migrants _{ij} as % of Pop. _i x Welfare Tax _i						0.104 (0.186)
Libya Bill _j	4.107*** (0.407)	3.781*** (0.296)	3.443*** (0.327)	4.036*** (0.425)	4.027*** (0.320)	3.182*** (0.333)
Iran Bill _j	3.595*** (0.434)	3.653*** (0.377)	3.524*** (0.349)	4.763*** (0.496)	3.757*** (0.378)	4.707*** (0.511)
Population _i	0.308 (0.211)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.366 ⁺ (0.212)	-0.030 (0.133)	-0.007* (0.003)	0.076 (0.139)
Unemployment _i	-0.090* (0.046)	-0.052* (0.022)	-0.060 (0.053)	-0.102* (0.041)	-0.037 ⁺ (0.020)	-0.068 (0.054)
Real GDP Growth _i	0.089 (0.093)	-0.012 (0.056)	0.029 (0.111)	0.115 (0.086)	0.054 (0.063)	0.055 (0.100)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	0.001* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.376 (0.399)	0.255 (0.184)	0.833 ⁺ (0.460)	0.050 (0.312)	0.035 (0.184)	0.667 ⁺ (0.380)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1713	1713	1522	1713	1713	1522

Table A12 This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

Table A13: Conditional Effects of Migrant Stocks on the Probability of Voting for Sanctions (Cont'd)

	(17)	(18)	(19)
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Migrant Stock _i	-0.624** (0.230)	-1.974* (0.794)	-0.835*** (0.246)
RWP Vote Share _i	-0.086 ⁺ (0.049)		
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Mig. _i x RWP Vote _i	-0.020 (0.029)		
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i		-0.999* (0.500)	
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Mig. _i x Anti-Immigrant Sentiment _i		0.691* (0.338)	
Welfare Tax _i			0.253 (0.527)
Migrants _{ij} as % of Total Mig. _i x Welfare Tax _i			-0.005 (0.014)
Libya Bill _j	3.721*** (0.434)	3.832*** (0.330)	3.069*** (0.339)
Iran Bill _j	4.748*** (0.473)	3.749*** (0.360)	4.881*** (0.536)
Population _i	0.031 (0.121)	-0.007* (0.003)	0.100 (0.140)
Unemployment _i	-0.103** (0.039)	-0.052* (0.022)	-0.077 (0.055)
Real GDP Growth _i	0.054 (0.076)	0.012 (0.052)	0.050 (0.102)
Distance (weighted) _{ij}	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)
Former Colony _{ij}	0.200 (0.291)	-0.054 (0.208)	0.826* (0.388)
Party Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
MEPs' Country Fixed Effects	✓		✓
Observations	1713	1713	1522

Table A13 This table portrays estimates using logit regression. The dependent variable is whether or not an MEP votes in favor of imposing/sustaining sanctions on country j . Both abstentions and absences are dropped from the analysis. Where necessary, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered on MEPs' countries and are shown in parentheses. For all bill fixed effects, the baseline is the bill concerning Syria. ***, **, * and ⁺ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively

However, we find little support for this. The interaction term between right-wing populist vote and *Migrant Stock_{ij}* in Model I1 is indistinguishable from zero. Only when measuring migrant stocks as a percentage of the MEP country's population does the interaction term reach statistical significance. Even here though, the increasing marginal effect of migrant shares as right-wing populist vote share grows is rather flat. For instance, when right-wing populist parties receive no share of the vote, moving from the minimum to the maximum

values of migrant share in Model 15 elicits approximately a 55-percentage-point decrease in the probability of voting for sanctions. When instead holding right-wing populist share at its mean, moving from the minimum to the maximum values of migrant share elicits a roughly 62 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for sanctions (Only a 7 percentage point difference in effect).²⁹ We also find no evidence supporting the prediction of Hypothesis 1C that higher amounts of welfare taxation will intensify the relationship between immigration and MEP opposition to sanctions.

Hypothesis 1B posits that high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment will increase the extent that migration promotes MEP opposition to sanctions. Here, in fact, the interaction term between migrant stocks and our anti-immigrant sentiment measure is consistently *positive* in Models I2, I5, and I7. Figure A3 in the appendix plots the marginal effect of *Migrant Stock_{ij}* across the range of anti-immigrant sentiment values in our data set. Only with low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment do migrant stocks appear to increase MEP opposition to economic sanctions. For countries with anti-immigrant sentiment scores roughly above the mean (*Anti-immigrant Sentiment_i*=2.5), the association between migration pressures and pro-sanction votes disappears. What accounts for this unintuitive finding? A likely explanation is that the positive interaction term reflects some sort of “ceiling effect” in countries with either high levels of immigration or high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Arzheimer 2009). In other words, when anti-immigrant sentiment is extremely strong, actual levels of migration are unlikely to have any additive effect on MEP opposition to sanctions. This interpretation would also explain why both component terms are consistently negative.

²⁹When moving into extremely high values of right-wing populist vote share, the marginal effect of migrant share on voting behavior starts to become *smaller*. However, we only have a smaller number of observations once right-wing populist vote share moves beyond 12 percent, thus causing the confidence intervals to widen and the marginal effects of migrant share to become indistinguishable from zero.

In sum, we find little evidence for Hypotheses 1A through 1C with an exception of right-wing populist parties in some models. It does not appear that anti-immigrant sentiment, presence of right-wing populist parties, or size of the welfare state exacerbates the negative relationship between migrant stocks and MEP opposition to sanctions. This might be perceived as positive news in the sense that especially xenophobic parts of society are unable to sway the behavior of MEPs any more than under “normal” circumstances. However, one may also interpret these null findings as suggesting that the political costs of immigration are not confined to countries where anti-immigrant sentiment is most visible.